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to identify possible mechanisms through which the relationship may operate. We then analyse matched 
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workplace influences workplace performance. We exploit the 2004 and 2011 Work Place and Employee 
Relations Surveys (WERS) to analyse the role of employee trust in influencing workplace performance in both 
pre and post recessionary periods. Our empirical findings support a positive relationship between three measures 
of workplace performance (financial performance, labour productivity and product or service quality) and 
employee trust at both points in time. We then exploit employee level data from the WERS to ascertain the 
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1. Introduction and Background 
Given the importance of identifying determinants of firm performance for understanding both 
economic growth and productivity at an aggregate level, it is not surprising that a vast 
literature exists exploring this issue focusing on a range of measures of firm performance 
such as financial performance (see, for example, Machin and Stewart, 1990, McNabb and 
Whitfield, 1998, and Munday et al., 2003) and labour productivity (see, for example, 
Griliches and Regev, 1995, Oulton, 1998, and Griffiths and Simpson, 2004). Many of the 
studies in this area focus on the role of firm level characteristics such as capital and labour 
inputs in determining firm performance.  
 It is apparent that employee behaviour may influence firm level performance given 
that many employees have some degree of discretion with respect to how hard they work 
(see, for example, Brown et al., 2011, who explore the relationship between worker 
commitment and workplace performance). In this paper, we focus on employee trust, which 
has attracted limited interest in the economics literature. Trust can be defined as ‘firm belief 
in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 
2013). It may be the case that employee trust in the workplace influences the behaviour of 
employees, which in turn affects firm performance. In particular, the extent to which 
employees trust that their managers will treat them honestly and fairly may influence the 
extent to which employees engage in opportunistic behaviour or otherwise. Thus, the degree 
of trust that employees have in their managers may impact upon firm performance.  
 The role of trust in the economy is being increasingly recognised in the economics 
literature at both the macroeconomic level, where there has been debate, for example, on the 
relationship between trust and economic growth (see, for example, Knack and Keefer, 1996, 
and, more recently, Algan and Cahuc, 2010) and at the microeconomic level, such as in the 
context of financial decision-making (see, for example, Guiso et al., 2008, who explore the 
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relationship between trust and stock market participation). A recent and comprehensive 
survey of the literature is provided by Algan and Cahuc (2013). There are an increasing 
number of studies in the economics literature exploring the determinants of trust at the 
individual level frequently using the standard trust question from the World Values Survey 
and the General Social Survey: Generally speaking would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (see, for example, Alesina and 
La Ferrara, 2002, and Bellemare and Kröger, 2007). There has also been some interest in the 
applied psychology and human resource management literatures, which have tended to 
explore the effects of specific workplace practices on employee trust. For example, Mayer 
and Davies (1999) explore the effects of a performance appraisal system in one particular 
workplace, whilst Blunsdon and Reed (2003), using Australian workplace data, find 
significant correlations between HR practices (such as having formalised policies and 
procedures) and employee trust in management. There is also some evidence that the degree 
of autonomy workers have over their work is associated with increased general trust, see 
Grund and Harbring (2009) for European evidence.  
There has been less attention paid in the economics literature, however, to the role of 
employee trust in the workplace and its implications for firm performance. One interesting 
exception is La Porta et al. (1997), who explore Fukuyama’s (1995) argument that high levels 
of trust amongst individuals serve to enhance the performance of all institutions in society 
including firms. They explore the effect of trust on the performance of large organisations in 
40 countries. The relative success of large firms in a country is measured by the sales of the 
large firms relative to GNP, where a large positive effect from general trust is found. A recent 
contribution in the finance literature by Goergen et al. (2012) focuses on the implications of 
intra-firm trust for firm performance and reports empirical evidence of a positive relationship. 
Their measure of intra-firm trust is based on responses to 64 questions covering staff 
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communication, profit-sharing, internal promotion, staff turnover and training. Such 
measures serve to capture the degree of intra-firm trust somewhat indirectly rather than 
employee trust per se. It is apparent that analysis of matched employee and firm level data 
may be a fruitful line of enquiry in order to shed further light on the relationship between 
firm performance and trust by exploiting more direct measures of employee trust. 
 This paper seeks to fill this gap in the existing literature. We begin, in Section 2, by 
developing a theoretical framework which establishes a link between employee trust and firm 
performance as well as indicating possible mechanisms through which the relationship may 
operate. In Section 3, we analyse matched workplace and employee data in order to explore 
whether employee trust influences workplace performance. To explore the robustness of our 
empirical findings, we exploit the 2004 and 2011 Work Place and Employee Relations 
Surveys (WERS) in order to analyse the role of employee trust in influencing workplace 
performance in both pre and post recessionary periods. Our empirical findings support a 
positive relationship between three measures of workplace performance (financial 
performance, labour productivity, and product or service quality) and employee trust. In 
Section 4, we exploit employee level data in order to ascertain the determinants of employee 
trust to shed some light on how such trust is influenced in the workplace. Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2. Theoretical Model 
In this section we seek to establish a theoretical basis for our hypothesis of a link between 
employee trust and firm performance and to outline possible mechanisms through which the 
relationship may operate. We begin by observing that each of our measures of firm 
performance (financial performance, labour productivity and service or product quality) can 
be enhanced by, amongst other things, eliciting greater employee effort, engagement with 
training, or, willingness to adopt new processes or work-place organisation. Our theory builds 
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on principal-agent arguments to illustrate how higher levels of employee trust in managers 
can help explain improvements in each of these firm performance-enhancing factors. 
 The principal-agent problem concerns a principal (here the manager), who wishes to 
incentivise the agent (here the employee) to undertake an action that is, or may appear to the 
agent to be, against their own best interests. We begin by outlining a typical characterization 
of the principal-agent problem. 
 Consider an agent with action set ܣ ≡ ሼܪ, ܮሽ, whose choice of action ܽ ∈ ܣ affects 
the value of output, ݒሺܽሻ and their own costs, ܿ௔, where ܿு ൐ ܿ௅. Let ܪ be the principal’s 
preferred action. Further, assume the principal is unable to observe the agent’s action (there is 
asymmetric information), or infer it from observing output (i.e. ݒሺܽሻ is not one-to-one). Since 
action ܪ is costly to the agent and unobservable to the principal, the principal knows the 
agent will have an incentive to select action, ܮ.  
 To simplify matters, let ࢜ be an n-vector of feasible values of ݒ௜ (݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊). Let ࢖௔ 
be an n-vector of probabilities, with each element, ݌௜௔	ሺ∑ ݌௜௔ ൌ 1௡௜ୀଵ ሻ, being the probability 
that ݒ௜ is observed given the agent’s action is ܽ. Given that the principal employs a payment 
contract ࢝ሺ࢜ሻ, we construct the following – linear in cost – von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function, ݑ௔ ൌ ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖௔ െ ܿ௔, for the agent, whom we assume to be risk-averse. We 
assume that the principal is risk-neutral, and that their objective is to design a payment 
contract ࢝ሺ࢜ሻ  to maximize ሺ࢜ െ ࢝ሻ࢖ு  subject to the agent’s incentive compatibility 
constraint: 
࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖ு െ ܿு ൒ ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖௅ െ ܿ௅,        (1) 
and participation constraint, with reservation utility, ݑത:  
࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖ு െ ܿு ൒ ݑത.         (2) 
 We now explore three framings of the principal-agent model to illustrate the potential 
channels through which trust can influence our firm performance measures: the first allows 
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us to see how trust can be used to elicit performance-enhancing effort, the second provides 
insight into how trust can engender participation and co-operation or reduce costly resistance 
to productivity/quality enhancing change, whilst the third demonstrates how trust can 
influence worker identity. 
2.1 Trust Eliciting Effort1  
In this section we let the elements H and L in the agent’s action set represent high (ܪ) and 
low (ܮ) effort. We also augment the basic model outlined above to include trust. We begin 
under a scenario in which the agency problem yields an equilibrium with the agent choosing 
action L. As such it is reasonable to assume that the agent knows, through experience, the 
rewards and costs associated with action L. The principal, in an effort to resolve the agency 
problem, wishes to assure the agent that the costs to action H are no greater than ܿு and that, 
given this, the contract that it offers, ࢝ሺ࢜ሻ , satisfies the constraints Eqs. (1) and (2). 
However, the agent, who has no experience of the actual rewards and costs associated with 
action H, may not trust the principal to keep to the contract, and/or, be truthful about the full 
costs of action H. Hence the agent has beliefs, ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖෥ு, about the distribution of returns and 
beliefs, ܿ̃ு, about the costs, under action ܪ, such that ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖෥ு ൌ ߠ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖ு	and ܿ̃ு ൌ ܿு/߮, 
where ߠሺݐሻ, ߮ሺݐሻ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ , ݐ  represents the level of employee trust, and ߠ′ሺݐሻ, ߮′ሺݐሻ ൒ 0 . 
Hence, even if the principal can design a feasible reward contract ࢝ሺ࢜ሻ which satisfies Eqs. 
(1) and (2), if employee trust, ݐ, is sufficiently low then it will not be possible to resolve the 
principal-agent problem. Consequently, since the discount parameters ߠሺݐሻ and ߮ሺݐሻ are non-
decreasing, higher levels of trust can increase the prospect of a given contract resolving the 
agency dilemma, yielding effort level H and raising productivity, quality and/or financial 
performance.  
                                                            
1  A similar argument is employed in Brown et al. (2011) to explain the potential link between worker 
commitment and loyalty and firm profit. 
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 Notice that, given the agent is risk averse, ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖ு is decreasing with uncertainty. 
Hence, higher levels of employee trust can act as a buffer helping to mitigate the effects of 
increased uncertainty (for instance during a recession), by increasing ߠ and hence ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖෥ு ൌ
ߠ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖ு. 
2.2 Trust Inducing Engagement with Training and Re-organisation 
In this section we adopt a slightly different principal-agent framework. In this case the 
principal can directly observe the action of the agent where H and L now refer, respectively, 
to high and low levels of investment/engagement in labour training, firm re-organisation or 
changes in working practices (or conversely low and high levels of resistance to training or 
re-organisation). Again, the principal’s preferred action is H.  
 Suppose that the principal wishes to uplift worker skills and/or reconfigure working 
practices or the working environment so as to achieve a new, more profitable, organizational 
regime. For simplicity, suppose that the principal can only achieve this new regime in a 
future period if the agent undertakes action H (high engagement with training and/or low 
resistance to change) in the current period. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. Hence we have 
two regimes ܴ ≡ ሼ݊, ݏሽ, where ݊ represents the new regime and ݏ represents the status quo. 
 With no asymmetry in information about the action of the agent, the principal can set 
a determinate reward profile for the agent ሺݓ௥, ݁௥ሻ  where ݓ௥  is the wage and ݁௥  is the 
working environment associated with regime ݎ ∈ ܴ. The principal’s objective is therefore to 
design a reward profile ሺݓ௦, ݁௦; ݓ௡, ݁௡ሻ so as to maximize ߨ௡ሺݓ௡, ݁௡ሻ subject to an optimality 
constraint: 
ߨ௡ሺݓ௡, ݁௡ሻ ൒ ߜ ൅ ߨ௦ሺݓ௦, ݁௦ሻ         (3) 
where ߜ is the time-adjusted value of the cost of the organizational change and/or training; an 
agent incentive compatibility constraint: 
ݑሺݓ௡, ݁௡ሻ ൒ ߱ ൅ ݑሺݓௌ, ௌ݁ሻ,         (4) 
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where, ߱ is the time-adjusted cost to the agent of the organizational change and/or training; 
and a participation constraint, with reservation utility, ݑത:  
ݑሺݓ௡, ݁௡ሻ െ ߱ ൒ ݑത.         (5) 
However, in the absence of trust the agent may heavily discount the claims of the principal in 
terms of the wage and working conditions in the new regime, or anticipate a significant 
understatement of the direct costs to the agent of undertaking action H, i.e. the agent may 
base its decisions on ݑሺߠݓ௡, ߠ݁௡ሻ and ߱/߮ instead of ݑሺݓ௡, ݁௡ሻ and ߱.2 Hence, even if the 
principal can devise a feasible reward profile which satisfies Eqs. (3)-(5), if trust is 
sufficiently low (i.e. ߠ and/or 1/߮ are sufficiently high) then the principal may not be able to 
find a reward profile which incentivizes the agent to opt for action H. Again, increasing 
employee trust increases the range of contracts which are feasible and satisfy Eqs. (4) and (5) 
thereby engendering the high-performance outcome for the firm. 
2.3 Trust to Change Worker Identity 
Finally, we consider the possibility that building employee trust can yield a change in worker 
identity along the lines discussed in Akerlof and Kranton (2005). In this case, the agent’s 
utility depends on their identity where agent identity is a function of organizational practices, 
or more specifically in the present situation, organizational practices which influence 
employee trust.  
 To illustrate, suppose the agent can have one of two identities, ܤ ≡ ሼݔ, ݕሽ. An agent 
with identity x (y) has an associated ‘norm’ under which utility is maximized, in terms of the 
principal’s preferred (non-preferred) action in the above models, with action H (L) and 
deviation from this action results in loss of utility.3 If the agent’s identity is x then the 
                                                            
2 It is not difficult to see that an employer might have an incentive to cheat on the agent once the agent has 
undertaken the productivity-enhancing training (especially if training develops firm-specific human capital) or 
given up their original work-practices, since these changes may be largely irreversible.  
3 For example, identity x (y) might represent a committed (non-committed) worker.  
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principal can stimulate action H at a lower wage than if agent identity is y. Replacing the cost 
term ܿ௔ in Eqs. (1) and (2) with: 
  ܿ௔ ൌ ݇௔ ൅ ߩ௕|݇∗ሺܾሻ െ ݇௔| െ ߤ௕        
where ݇௔  is the agent’s cost under action  ܽ ∈ ܣ , ߤ௕  represents the utility that the agent 
achieves with identity ܾ ∈ ܤ, whilst ߩ௕|݇∗ሺܾሻ െ ݇௔| is a potential penalty incurred due to any 
divergence from the agent’s ‘ideal’ action given they have identity ܾ. Hence investing to 
build employee trust to influence worker’s identity – changing worker identity from type y to 
type x – reduces the penalty associated with action H, raising ߤ௕. Since both effects diminish 
the ‘net cost’ term, enhancing ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖ு െ ܿு  relative to ࢛ሺ࢝ሻ࢖௅ െ ܿ௅  they increase the 
likelihood of H relative to L. 
 Having motivated the link between employee trust and workplace performance from a 
theoretical perspective, and identified potential mechanisms through which this may operate, 
the remainder of the paper considers whether an empirical relationship exists between trust 
and performance using matched employee-employer data. 
3. Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Trust and Workplace Performance 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
In order to explore the relationship between employee trust and workplace performance from 
an empirical perspective, we analyse data drawn from the Workplace and Employee 
Relations Surveys (WERS). The aim of the WERS is to provide nationally representative data 
on the state of workplace relations and employment practices in Britain. We focus on data 
drawn from the most recent survey, namely the 2011 WERS, which is the sixth in the series. 
We also explore the robustness of our findings by analysing the 2004 WERS, which relates to 
the pre financial crisis period and, hence, allows us to explore whether the relationship 
between employee trust and workplace performance varies with the prevailing economic 
climate. The survey population for both the 2004 and 2011 WERS is all British workplaces 
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with at least 5 employees.4 The sample for the 2011 WERS comprises 2,680 workplaces, 
with the sample used in the econometric analysis discussed below being reduced to 1,550 
workplaces, once missing values are taken into account. For the 2004 WERS, the sample 
comprises 2,295 workplaces, with the sample used for our econometric analysis including 
1,432 workplaces due to missing data. The WERS comprises four main sections: the Worker 
Representative Questionnaire; the Financial Performance Questionnaire; the Management 
Questionnaire; and the Employee Questionnaire. The first three sections yield establishment 
level information, whilst the final section (the Employee Questionnaire) provides employee 
level information. Our empirical analysis exploits data drawn from the Management and 
Employee Questionnaires. 
We conduct workplace level analysis in order to explore the determinants of three 
measures of relative workplace performance, namely: financial performance, labour 
productivity and the quality of service or product. The workplace performance measures are 
derived from the following question included in the Management Questionnaire: I now want 
to ask you how your workplace is currently performing compared with other establishments 
in the same industry. How would you assess your workplace’s (i) financial performance (ii) 
labour productivity and (iii) quality of product or service? The management representative 
was asked to indicate in which of the following categories financial performance ( wFP ), 
labour productivity ( wLP ) and quality of product or service ሺݍ௪) lay: (i) a lot better than 
average; (ii) better than average; (iii) about average; (iv) below average or a lot below 
average, where w denotes the workplace subscript. 
From the responses to these questions, we have constructed three four-point indices 
where a value of 3 denotes ‘a lot better than average’, a value of 2 denotes ‘better than 
average’, a value of 1 denotes ‘about average’ and a value of zero denotes ‘below or a lot 
                                                            
4  Workplaces in agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying, private households with 
employed persons, and extra-territorial organizations, are excluded. 
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below average’. The distributions of each of the three measures of workplace performance are 
given in the table below. 
Workplace performance: % in each category 
 wFP  wLP  ݍ௪ 
% 2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011 
A lot better than average 11.45 13.09 6.94 9.22 22.41 25.81
Better than average 41.08 39.56 42.05 43.68 55.17 52.44
About average 38.93 40.07 44.90 41.76 19.99 19.67
Below average 8.54 7.29 6.11 5.34 2.43 2.08
These measures of firm performance are clearly subjective and, in addition, the response 
rates, which are relatively consistent across 2011 and 2004, also suggest that bias exists 
towards responding in the average and above categories.5 It may be the case that the three 
workplace performance variables are subject to measurement error (see Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001, and Forth and McNabb, 2008).  Random measurement error makes it 
difficult to explain variations in workplace performance, whilst if the measurement error is 
correlated with the explanatory variables, this leads to spurious correlation with the 
subjective dependent variables (Brown et al., 2011). Such issues will arguably be mitigated 
since the data relating to the key explanatory variables of interest are provided by employees 
(i.e. trust, which, as discussed in detail below, is elicited from responses to the Employee 
Questionnaire) whereas the subjective workplace performance measures are provided by 
management representatives. Less correlation is expected, therefore, between the 
measurement error in the measures of workplace performance and the key explanatory 
variables.6  
                                                            
5 In the Financial Performance Questionnaire, continuous measures of workplace financial performance, such as 
sales turnover, are available. However, the sample sizes are greatly reduced (roughly 25 per cent of firms remain 
for the 2004 WERS), which is likely to lead to a non random sample. Furthermore, Chaplin et al. (2005) state 
that a relatively high percentage of workplaces declined to take part in this section of the 2004 WERS, with a 
lower average response rate reported for those firms listed on the stock exchange. Similarly, the response rate 
for this part of WERS 2011 was somewhat low at 31.8%, providing information on up to only 545 workplaces 
(van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Consequently, in what follows, we do not analyse the continuous measures of firm 
performance.  
6 Furthermore, evaluations of these subjective measures of workplace performance have indicated that their 
ordinal properties are unaffected by such bias (see Bryson et al., 2005). In addition, comparisons of these 
subjective measures and objective profitability and productivity data are found to be weakly equivalent and 
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The measures of employee trust are derived from the Employee Questionnaire. In the 
2011 and the 2004 WERS, up to 25 employees from each workplace were asked to complete 
the Employee Questionnaire yielding samples of 18,492 employee-workplace observations in 
2011 and 17,532 in 2004, after conditioning on missing data. The Employee Questionnaire 
contains information on a number of different measures of employee trust. To be specific, 
employees were asked to indicate whether they strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with the statements: Managers here can be relied 
upon to keep their promises ( ݐଵ ); Managers here deal with employees honestly ( ݐଶ ); 
Managers here treat employees fairly (ݐଷ); and Managers here are sincere in attempting to 
understand employees’ views (ݐସ). The responses to these four questions are used to create 
four trust indices which are increasing in the level of employee trust and run from one 
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree). We then match averages of the trust measures in 
each work place (ݐଵ̅, ݐଶ̅, ݐଷ̅	and	ݐସ̅ሻ	with the workplace performance information to explore 
how the average level of employee trust prevailing in the workplace is correlated with 
workplace performance. Due to the possibility of co-linearity between the four employee 
trust measures, they are included independently rather than simultaneously in the 
specification.7 Hence, four ordered probit specifications are modelled for each of the three 
measures of workplace performance conditional on each alternative measure of employee 
trust, ݐ௪̅, and other explanatory variables, ࢄ௪, as follows:8 
ݕ௪∗ ൌ ࢄ௪ᇱ ࢼ ൅ ߰ݐ௪̅ ൅ ߝ௪        (6) 
where the unit of analysis is the workplace, w=1,…,W, (in WERS 2011 W=1,550 and in 
WERS 2004 W=1,432) in which the continuous latent performance of the workplace, ݕ௪∗ , is 
observed in discrete form through a censoring mechanism: ݕ௪ ൌ ݆		if		ߤ௝ିଵ ൏ ݕ௪∗ 	൑ ߤ௝, with j 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
produce similar results (Forth and McNabb, 2008). Similar evidence is reported by Wall et al. (2004), who 
explore the validity of subjective measures of firm performance.  
7 Indeed, the pairwise correlation coefficients between the four measures of trust are all above 0.7 and are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
8 We have also used a generalised ordered probit model and we find that the general pattern of results remains. 
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outcomes and the ߤ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated. Hence, the probability that 
alternative j is chosen is the probability that the latent variable, ݕ௪∗ , is between two 
boundaries ߤ௝ିଵ and  ߤ௝. 
It is interesting to note that, as shown in the table below, the average level of 
employee trust within the workplace, i.e. ݐ௪̅ ൌ ሺ1 ܰ⁄ ሻ∑ ݐ௜ே௜ୀଵ  where there are i=1,…,N 
employees in workplace w, is similar in the post (2011) and pre (2004) financial crisis 
periods.  In addition, it is interesting to note the similarity in the mean values of the four 
measures of employee trust. 
 WERS 2011 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
WERS 2004 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
ݐଵ̅ 3.3273 (0.6030) 3.2972 (0.5950) ݐଶ̅ 3.4779 (0.5848) 3.4627 (0.5753) ݐଷ̅ 3.4665 (0.5921) 3.4642 (0.5814) ݐସ̅ 3.4357 (0.6099) 3.3991 (0.5771) 
Number of Observations 1,550 1,432 
In each of the ordered probit models of workplace performance, controls in the vector  
ࢄ௪ include: trade union density; firm size; industry (distinguishing between: manufacturing; 
electricity, gas and water; construction; wholesale and retail; hotels and restaurants; transport 
and communication; financial services; other business services; public administration; 
education; health; and other community services); years in operation; the average amount of 
training provided to employees; the proportion of experienced staff in the largest 
occupational group who had training in past year; the percentage of employees using 
computers; whether the workplace competes at the regional (the omitted category), national 
or international level; and the percentage of employees by occupation (distinguishing 
between: managers and senior officials; professional; associate professional and technical; 
administrative and secretarial; skilled trades; caring, leisure and other personal service; sales 
and customer service; process, plant and machine operatives and drivers; and routine). 
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3.2 Results 
Table 1a presents the marginal effects relating to the effects of the employee trust measures 
on each category of the workplace performance measures for the 2011 WERS, whilst Table 
1b presents the analogous results for the 2004 WERS.9 Focusing initially on Table 1a, it is 
apparent that, for financial performance and labour productivity, trust is inversely related to 
being in the ‘about average’ and ‘below average’ categories and positively associated with 
being in the ‘a lot better than average’ and ‘better than average’ categories. So higher levels 
of employee trust (across all four measures of employee trust) appear to be positively related 
to workplace financial performance and labour productivity. With respect to product or 
service quality, employee trust is positively associated with being in the ‘a lot better than 
average’ category and inversely associated with being in the other three categories, the 
positive influence on the probability of reporting the highest level of this measure of 
workplace performance being particularly pronounced in terms of magnitude. For example, 
focusing on Table 1a panel c, it is evident that each alternative measure of trust, evaluated at 
the mean, increases the probability that product or service quality is ‘a lot better than average’ 
by approximately 8 to 9 percentage points.  
 Turning to Table 1b, it is evident that the pattern of the results is consistent across the 
2011 and the 2004 WERS thereby endorsing the finding that employee trust is positively 
associated with higher levels of workplace performance. There are, however, some 
differences across the two years in terms of the magnitude of the effect of employee trust on 
workplace performance. For example, with the exception of ݐସ̅  (Managers here are sincere in 
attempting to understand employees’ views), the positive effect of employee trust on the 
                                                            
9 For brevity, we only present the results relating to the employee trust variables. The results relating to the other 
control variables, which are available on request, accord with the existing literature. For example, competing on 
an international level and the proportion of employees receiving training are positively associated with financial 
performance, labour productivity and product/service quality. Firm size is positively associated with financial 
performance, whilst competing at a national level is positively associated with product or service quality. 
Operating in the financial services sector is positively associated with financial performance and labour 
productivity. 
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probability of reporting the highest category for the financial performance measure (i.e. being 
‘a lot better than average’) is higher in 2011 than in 2004. Similarly, and again with the 
exception of ݐସ̅, the positive effect of employee trust on the probability of reporting the ‘a lot 
better than average’ category for the quality of product or service measure is considerably 
higher in 2011 as compared to the effect in 2004 by around 2 to 4 percentage points. The 
largest differential in terms of magnitude is for whether managers are deemed to treat 
employees fairly, ݐଶ̅, at 4.2 percentage points. Conversely, the positive effect of employee 
trust on the probability of reporting the ‘better than average’ category for labour productivity 
is much higher in 2004, i.e. pre the economic recession, than in 2011. 
Overall, our findings, which support the existence of a statistically significant 
relationship between employee trust and workplace performance, with high levels of 
employee trust in their managers being associated with higher levels of relative workplace 
performance, are consistent with our theoretical priors. Moreover, these findings are robust 
across four different measures of employee trust and three different measures of workplace 
performance, as well across the 2011 and 2004 surveys. Indeed, it would appear that the 
influence of employee trust on workplace performance has become more important during 
the recession. Again, this is consistent with our theoretical priors (see Section 2.1).  
4. The Determinants of Employee Trust 
4.1 Data and Methodology 
Given that the findings presented in Section 3 indicate a positive relationship between 
employee trust and workplace performance, the natural next step is to ascertain what 
influences the degree of employees’ trust in their managers. We therefore analyse employee 
level data drawn from the WERS Employee Questionnaire. We focus on the most recent 
WERS, i.e. the 2011 survey, since it includes a set of questions relating to whether employees 
were influenced by the recent recession with respect to a variety of aspects relating to their 
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jobs. Again, in order to analyse the robustness of our findings, we explore the determinants of 
the four measures of employee trust (described in Section 3 above).  
The distribution of employee trust appears to be consistent across the four measures 
as reported in the table below. It is apparent that the majority of the responses across the four 
measures fall into the ‘agree’ category, with ‘strongly disagree’ being the least populated 
category.  
Employee trust measures: % responding in each category 
 ݐଵ ݐଶ ݐଷ ݐସ 
Strongly agree 10.47  12.78 14.93 12.09
Agree 37.30 42.50 41.49 42.70
Neither agree nor disagree 29.76 26.14 23.84 24.48
Disagree 16.13 13.21 12.68 14.96
Strongly disagree 6.34 5.36  7.06 5.77
Given that the trust measures are ordered five-point indices, we use an ordered probit 
specification to model each of the four measures of trust as follows: 
ݐ௜௪∗ ൌ ࢆଵ௪ᇱ ࢽ ൅ ࢆଶ௜ᇱ ࣘ ൅ ߝ௜௪        (7) 
where the unit of analysis is the employee, i=1,…,N, in workplace, w=1,…,W. The 
continuous latent trust of the employee, ݐ௜௪∗ , is observed in discrete form through a censoring 
mechanism: ݐ௜௪ ൌ ݇		if		ߤ௞ିଵ ൏ ݐ௜௪∗ 	൑ ߤ௞ , with k outcomes and the ߤ ’s are unknown 
parameters to be estimated. Standard errors are clustered at the workplace level to account for 
the possibility that up to 25 employees may be observed for each workplace.10  
With respect to the explanatory variables, we include a set of job and work related 
characteristics, ࢆଵ௪ᇱ , and a set of personal characteristics, ࢆଶ௜ᇱ . We control for the following 
job and work related characteristics: the natural logarithm of the individual’s weekly 
contractual hours; the employee’s workplace tenure distinguishing between less than one year 
(the omitted category), 1 to less than 2 years, 2 to less than 5 years, 5 to less than 10 years 
and 10 years or more; how much training he/she has received during the last 12 months either 
                                                            
10 Our findings are robust to employing a random effects ordered probit framework. 
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paid for or organised by the employer (excluding health and safety training), none (the 
omitted category), less than 1 day, 1 to less than 2 days, 2 to less than 5 days, 5 to less than 
10 days, 10 days or more; trade union membership; and a set of dummy variables indicating 
which range that the individual’s weekly gross pay falls into, less than £60 (the omitted 
category), £61-£100, £101-£130, £131-£170, £171-£220, £221-£260, £261-£310, £311-£370, 
£371-£430, £431-£520, £521-£650, £651-£820, £821-£1050 and £1051 or more. 11  With 
respect to personal characteristics, we control for gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, health 
status, education, number of children and religion.  
Our focus on the 2011 WERS relates to the inclusion in the Employee Questionnaire 
of the following question: ‘Did any of the following happen to you as a result of the most 
recent recession whilst working at this workplace? My workload increased; My job was re-
organised; I was moved to another job; My wages were frozen or cut; My nonwage benefits 
were reduced; My contracted working hours were reduced; Access to paid overtime was 
restricted; I was required to take unpaid leave; And access to training was restricted. Thus, 
we include a set of control variables capturing whether (as well as how) the individual 
reported that he/she was affected by the recent recession where these are entered into 
equation (7) as binary controls.12 It is apparent from the summary statistics presented in the 
final column of Table 2 that 26% of employees felt that their workload had increased as a 
result of the recession, with 18% reporting that their work had been re-organised. 
Approximately 32% reported that their wages had been frozen or cut, contrasting with only 
5% reporting that their non-wage benefits had been reduced. Access to paid overtime and 
access to training being restricted were reported by 17% and 12% of employees, respectively. 
4.2 Results 
                                                            
11 The equivalent amounts are translated into annual pay in the questionnaire. 
12 It should be acknowledged that the variables capture the employee’s perceptions regarding whether and how 
they were influenced by the recession, i.e. they reflect the employee’s judgements regarding the perceived 
causation of the effects. 
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In Table 2, for brevity, we present selected results relating to the coefficients estimated in 
modelling ݐଵ , the ordered index capturing the extent to which employees agree with the 
statement: Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises. Given our focus, we 
present the estimated coefficients related to the job and work-related characteristics.13 It is 
apparent that the amount of training received by employees is positively associated with 
employee trust, whereas workplace tenure, hours worked and trade union membership are all 
inversely associated with employee trust. With respect to pay, the highest pay category is 
positively associated with trust with an inverse association being apparent for the middle 
categories relative to being in the lowest pay category.  
With respect to the set of variables relating to experiences due to the economic 
recession, with the exception of being required to take unpaid leave, it is apparent that the 
estimated coefficients are all negative and generally highly statistically significant. The 
marginal effects relating to this set of variables are presented in Table 3 where it can be seen 
that the set of variables capturing whether or not employees have been influenced by the 
financial crisis (with the exception of having to take unpaid leave) all have a positive 
influence on being in the relatively low employee trust categories and a negative influence on 
being in the relatively high employee trust categories. Focusing firstly on ݐଵ, managers here 
can be relied upon to keep their promises, it is apparent that restricting access to paid 
overtime has a relatively large inverse effect on the probability of responding in the ‘agree’ 
category, at 7 percentage points, closely followed by the size of the effects of an increased 
workload and access to training being restricted, both at around 5 percentage points. 
Moreover the effects related to these three variables are highly statistically significant. The 
cumulative effect of the recession variables may play an important role in influencing 
                                                            
13 The analogous results for the other three employee trust measures are in line with those presented in Table 2 
and are available on request, as are the results pertaining to the effects of the personal characteristics of the 
employees. With respect to personal characteristics, being male and being in poor health are consistently 
associated with lower levels of trust, whilst being white or Asian are associated with reporting higher levels of 
trust. 
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employee trust. Hence, in the second part of the table we present the marginal effects 
associated with an index of the number of recession effects reported by the employee which 
ranges from zero to nine. The results indicate that a higher value of the index is associated an 
increased probability of reporting the lower categories of employee trust. 
Similar results are found for ݐଶ and ݐଷ, managers here deal with employees honestly 
and managers here treat employees fairly, respectively, with highly significant effects also 
found for job re-organisation. A slightly different pattern of marginal effects is found for ݐସ, 
managers here are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views, with negative 
effects found for category 5 only. The largest inverse effect on reporting category 5 ‘strongly 
agree’ was once again associated with restricting access to paid overtime, with highly 
statistically significant effects also found for restricting access to training and job re-
organisation. For example, job re-organisation is associated with around a 3 percentage point 
lower probability that employees ‘strongly agree’ that managers treat employees fairly (see 
panel c). It is noticeable across the four measures of employee trust that being required to 
take unpaid leave does not appear to influence employee trust. Such a finding may reflect 
differing values placed on having additional time away from work related to the earnings and 
effort associated with being at work.14 
 It is apparent that the changes experienced by employees due to the recession are 
changes experienced at the individual level. It is also interesting to explore the influence of 
organisational changes introduced at the workplace level on employee trust and whether 
the influence of such changes on employee trust varies across the 2004 and 2011 WERS. 
                                                            
14 We have experimented with a variety of specifications. For example, we have incorporated controls for 
workplace characteristics such as: workplace size; the percentage of employees dismissed over the last year; the 
percentage of employees made redundant over the last year; the frequency of meetings between senior managers 
and the whole workforce; and the number of committees of managers and employees primarily concerned with 
consultation (rather than negotiation). Workplace size is the only additional control to consistently exert a 
statistically significant influence with workplace size generally being inversely associated with employee trust. 
The pattern of results relating to the variables capturing the effects of the recent recession remains unaltered 
with particularly statistically significant influences found for: my workload increased; my job was re-organised; 
my wages were frozen or cut; access to paid overtime was restricted; and access to training was restricted. 
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Hence, we exploit the responses to the following questions which were included in the 
Management Questionnaire and hence provide information at the workplace level which 
we then match with the employee level data. In the 2004 WERS, management 
representatives were asked: over the past two years has management introduced any of the 
following changes: introduction of performance related pay; introduction or upgrading of 
computers; introduction or upgrading of other technology; changes in working time 
arrangements; changes in the organisation of work; changes in work techniques or 
procedures; introduction of initiatives to involve employees; and introduction of 
technologically new or significantly improved product or service. In the 2011 WERS, the 
second and third categories were combined as follows: introduction or upgrading of new 
technology (including computers). Hence, seven types of organisational change were 
identified in the 2011 WERS as compared to eight in the 2004 WERS.  
We exploit this information to explore the relationship between employee trust and 
organizational change by re-estimating equation (7) above replacing the variables 
associated with changes experienced by employees as a result of the recent recession with 
the organisational change variables described above. 15  The results are summarised in 
Tables 4 and 5 below, which present the marginal effects associated with the organisational 
change variables. Table 4 presents the results relating to the 2011 WERS and Table 5 
presents the results relating to the 2004 WERS. As above, it may be the case that employee 
trust is influenced by the cumulative effects of the various types of organisational change. 
Hence, in the second part of each table, we replace the set of organisational change dummy 
variables with an index denoting the number of types of change introduced by the 
organisation over the last two years. For the 2011 WERS, the index runs from zero to 
seven, whilst for the 2004 WERS the index runs from zero to eight. 
                                                            
15 The set of controls for employee characteristics excludes religion since this was not available in the 2004 
WERS. 
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It is apparent that there are only two organisational change variables that achieve 
statistical significance in the 2011 WERS across the four measures of employee trust, 
namely: changes in working time arrangements and changes in the organisation of work. 
These two types of organisational change are generally associated with an increased 
probability of reporting trust in the lowest three categories and inversely associated with 
reporting trust in the highest two categories. Thus, the findings suggest that this type of 
organisational change, in line with the effects of changes associated with the recent 
recession, erodes employee trust. These effects are, however, smaller in magnitude than 
those capturing the effects of the recent recession. In 2011, none of the other types of 
organisational change appear to influence employee trust. For the index of the number of 
types of organisational change, across the four measures of employee trust, an inverse 
relationship is apparent. 
Interestingly, if the set of organisational change variables are included as well as 
the set of variables capturing the effects of the recent recession, the pattern of the effects 
associated with the effects of the recent recession remains in terms of sign and statistical 
significance, although, as expected, some of the marginal effects are slightly smaller in 
magnitude. The only organisational change measures to exert statistically significant 
influences are once again changes in working time arrangements and changes in the 
organisation of work, with the findings suggesting that these changes are associated with 
lower employee trust. The estimated magnitudes of these effects are small in comparison to 
those associated with the variables capturing the effects of the recent recession.  
For the 2004 WERS, it is apparent that changes in working time arrangements are 
inversely associated with trust across all four measures of employee trust, whilst changes 
in the organisation of work are inversely associated with employee trust for three of the 
trust measures: managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises;  managers here 
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deal with employees honestly; and mangers are sincere in attempting to understand 
employees’ views. Interestingly, in the pre-recession period, there is one type of 
organisational change, introduction or upgrading of computers, which is positively 
associated with employee trust being inversely associated with reporting the relatively low 
levels of trust and positively associated with reporting the high levels of trust. Dolton and 
Makepeace (2004) report a substantial wage premium associated with computer use for 
some individuals in the UK. Thus, the findings may partially reflect wage increases 
experienced or expected with such changes. The findings therefore suggest that certain 
types of organisational change may serve to enhance employee trust.16 In Section 2, we set 
out a theoretical framework to consider how organisational practices can influence 
employee trust and engender workplace performance-enhancing behaviour. The same 
framework can be used equally well to explain the reverse situation: practices that damage 
trust and reduce workplace performance. In this Section we have found evidence of both 
types of practice, although the results relating to the index organisational change suggest 
an inverse relationship between employee trust and the number of types of organisational 
change introduced. 
5. Conclusion 
We have explored the relationship between employee trust and workplace performance from 
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Our theoretical framework has established a link 
between employee trust and firm performance and has also indicated possible mechanisms 
through which such a relationship may operate. Our empirical findings, based on matched 
workplace and employee data from the WERS 2004 and 2011, support a positive relationship 
between three measures of workplace performance (financial performance, labour 
                                                            
16 If we combine the variables representing the introduction or upgrading of computers and the introduction or 
upgrading of other technology in the 2004 WERS, in line with the results presented in Table 5, we find positive 
effects associated with this type of organisational change. We present the findings associated with keeping these 
two categories separate in order to allow a more precise definition of the types of change and to tie in with the 
specific question included in the Management Questionnaire. 
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productivity and product or service quality) and four measures of employee trust. Our 
findings are generally similar across 2004 and 2011 with the exception that the effect of 
employee trust on ‘the better than average’ category for labour productivity is much higher in 
2004, i.e. pre the economic recession, than in 2011. Our analysis of the determinants of 
employee trust highlights the effects of how workplaces have dealt with the recent recession. 
It is apparent that restricting paid overtime potentially erodes employee trust, whilst requiring 
employees to take unpaid leave appears to have no effect on employee trust. In addition, we 
find that job or work reorganisation experienced at either the employee or organisational 
level are associated with lower employee trust. Our findings therefore highlight the 
importance of employee trust for workplace performance as well as shedding some light on 
how such trust is influenced by job and work related characteristics. 
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TABLE 1A: Workplace Performance and Employee Trust; Ordered Probit Analysis; WERS 2011 
PANEL A: Dependent Variable = Financial Performance (ܨ ௪ܲ); Marginal Effects 
 0 1 2 3 
Trust Measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
ݐଵ̅ -0.0260 (-4.02) -0.0577 (-4.07) 0.0396 (4.00) 0.0440 (4.11)ݐଶ̅ -0.0262 (-3.95) -0.0581 (-3.99) 0.0399 (3.93) 0.0444 (4.03)ݐଷ̅ -0.0233 (-3.61) -0.0514 (-3.65) 0.0353 (3.60) 0.0394 (3.68)ݐସ̅ -0.0204 (-3.15) -0.0448 (-3.17)  0.0307 (3.14) 0.0344 (3.19)
PANEL B: Dependent Variable = Labour Productivity (ܮ ௪ܲ); Marginal Effects 
 0 1 2 3 
Trust Measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
ݐଵ̅ -0.0191 (-3.59) -0.0575 (-3.69) 0.0473 (3.66) 0.0293 (3.67)ݐଶ̅ -0.0157 (-2.90) -0.0470 (-2.95) 0.0386 (2.93) 0.0241 (2.94)ݐଷ̅ -0.0152 (-2.86) -0.0452 (-2.91) 0.0372 (2.90) 0.0232 (2.90)ݐସ̅ -0.0156 (-2.94) -0.0466 (-3.00) 0.0383 (2.98) 0.0239 (2.99)
PANEL C: Dependent Variable = Product or Service Quality (ݍ௪); Marginal Effects 
 0 1 2 3 
Trust Measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
ݐଵ̅ -0.0113 (-4.23) -0.0679 (-5.31) -0.0090 (-2.30) 0.0881 (5.40)ݐଶ̅ -0.0116 (-4.24) -0.0703 (-5.31) -0.0093 (-2.30) 0.0912 (5.40)ݐଷ̅ -0.0107 (-4.11) -0.0644 (-5.06) -0.0085 (-2.28) 0.0837 (5.14)ݐସ̅ -0.0110 (-4.20) -0.0670 (-5.21) -0.0088 (-2.29) 0.0868 (5.30)
 
TABLE 1B: Workplace Performance and Employee Trust; Ordered Probit Analysis; WERS 2004 
PANEL A: Dependent Variable = Financial Performance (ܨ ௪ܲ); Marginal effects 
 0 1 2 3 
Trust Measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
ݐଵ̅ -0.0285 (-3.46) -0.0489 (-3.46) 0.0417 (3.44) 0.0357 (3.48)ݐଶ̅ -0.0247 (-2.92) -0.0421 (-2.92) 0.0360 (2.91) 0.0309 (2.93)ݐଷ̅ -0.0181 (-2.21) -0.0307 (-2.21) 0.0262 (2.21) 0.0226 (2.22)ݐସ̅ -0.0284 (-3.32) -0.0483 (-3.32) 0.0414 (3.31) 0.0353 (3.34)
PANEL B: Dependent Variable = Labour Productivity (ܮ ௪ܲ); Marginal effects 
 0 1 2 3 
Trust Measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
ݐଵ̅ -0.0261 (-4.00) -0.0673 (-4.08) 0.0643 (4.08) 0.0290 (4.02)ݐଶ̅ -0.0253 (-3.77) -0.0649 (-3.83) 0.0621 (3.83) 0.0281 (3.78)ݐଷ̅ -0.0193 (-3.00) -0.0491 (-3.02) 0.0470 (3.03) 0.0214 (3.00)ݐସ̅ -0.0283 (-4.17) -0.0726 (-4.26) 0.0698 (4.26) 0.0312 (4.19)
PANEL C: Dependent Variable = Product or Service Quality (ݍ௪); Marginal effects 
 0 1 2 3 
Trust Measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
ݐଵ̅ -0.0092 (-3.43) -0.0570 (-3.98) -0.0006 (-0.20) 0.0669 (4.02)ݐଶ̅ -0.0068 (-2.61) -0.0413 (-2.82) -0.0005 (-0.20) 0.0486 (2.84)ݐଷ̅ -0.0074 (-2.87) -0.0450 (-3.17) -0.0005 (-0.20) 0.0529 (3.19)ݐସ̅ -0.0093 (-3.35) -0.0571 (-3.86) -0.0006 (-0.20) 0.0670 (3.90)
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TABLE 2: Determinants of Employee Trust; Ordered Probit Analysis of 
Employee Level  Data; WERS 2011 
Dependent Variable = ݐଵ 
 Coef T-stat Mean 
Job characteristics  
Tenure 1-2 years -0.1278 (-3.47)  0.0959  
Tenure 2-5 years -0.1937  (-6.32)  0.2346  
Tenure 5-10 years -0.2072  (-6.61)  0.2421  
Tenure >10 years -0.2354  (-7.33)  0.3101  
Train < 1 day 0.0744  (2.61)  0.1217  
Train 1-2 days 0.2230  (8.42)  0.1699  
Train 2-5 days 0.3498  (14.05)  0.2364 
Train 5-10 days 0.4122  (12.56)  0.1059  
Train > 10 days 0.5082  (13.56)  0.0664  
Trade Union Member -0.2775  (-12.96)  0.3783  
Log Weekly Hours -0.1295  (-4.36)  3.4252  
Gross pay £61-£100 -0.0221  (-0.37)  0.0346 
Gross pay £101-£130 -0.0528  (-0.85)  0.0315  
Gross pay £131-£170 -0.1262  (-2.20)  0.0444  
Gross pay £171-£220 -0.1505  (-2.81)  0.0736  
Gross pay £221-£260 -0.1516  (-2.76)  0.0719  
Gross pay £261-£310 -0.2102  (-3.75)  0.0895  
Gross pay £311-£370 -0.2086  (-3.82)  0.1086  
Gross pay £371-£430 -0.1791  (-3.25)  0.0977  
Gross pay £431-£520 -0.1870  (-3.38)  0.1050 
Gross pay £521-£650 -0.2011  (-3.48)  0.1007  
Gross pay £651-£820 -0.0906  (-1.49)  0.0821  
Gross pay £821-£1050 -0.0276  (-0.42)  0.0453  
Gross pay > £1051 0.1579  (2.31)  0.0393  
Experience of recession  
Workload increased -0.2198  (-9.92)  0.2619  
Work was reorganised -0.1521  (-6.00)  0.1803  
Moved to another job -0.1043  (-2.71)  0.0538 
Wages frozen or cut -0.1210  (-5.70)  0.3236  
Non-wage benefits reduced -0.1296  (-3.31)  0.0507  
Contracted work hours reduced -0.1682  (-3.13)  0.0407  
Access to paid overtime restricted -0.3034  (-12.68)  0.1679 
Required to take unpaid leave 0.0299  (0.37)  0.0174  
Access to training restricted -0.2116  (-7.28)  0.1170 
Cut point 1 (̂ߤଵ) -2.5316  -7.7984  
Cut point 2 (̂ߤଶ) -1.6736  -13.1011  
Cut point 3 (̂ߤଷ) -0.7783  -6.1100  
Cut point 4 (̂ߤସ) 0.5241  4.1084  
Log pseudo likelihood -23,423.731  
Wald Chi squared (67)      2,377.26  
Pseudo R squared    0.0559  
Number of observations 18,492  
Notes: (i) Controls are also included for a set of personal characteristics: Male; White; Aged 
18-19; Aged 20-21; Aged 22-29; Aged 30-39; Aged 40-49; Aged 50-59; Aged 60-64; Aged 65 
and over; Married; Separated, widowed or divorced; Children; Health problem; Highest 
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educational qualification, GCSE, A level, first degree or higher degree; Christian religion; and 
other religion. (ii) The standard deviations for log weekly hours (the only continuous variable 
reported above) is 0.4479. 
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 TABLE 3:  Employee Trust and the Recent Financial Recession; Ordered Probit 
Analysis; WERS 2011 
PANEL A: Dependent variable = Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (ݐଵ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Effects of Recent Recession: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
My workload increased 0.0218 
 (9.37) 
0.0413 
(9.87) 
0.0242 
(9.52) 
-0.0539 
 (-9.82) 
-0.0335 
 (-9.65) 
My job was re-organised 0.0151 
 (5.95) 
0.0286 
(5.96) 
0.0167 
(5.90) 
-0.0373 
 (-5.99) 
-0.0231 
(-5.94) 
I was moved to another job 0.0103 
 (2.71) 
0.0196 
(2.71) 
0.0115 
(2.68) 
-0.0256 
 (-2.71) 
-0.0159 
(-2.70) 
My wages were frozen or cut 0.0120 
 (5.74) 
0.0227 
 (5.67) 
0.0133 
(5.52) 
-0.0296 
 (-5.69) 
-0.0184 
 (-5.63) 
My nonwage benefits were reduced 0.0129 
 (3.28) 
0.0243 
(3.31) 
0.0142 
(3.29) 
-0.318 
 (-3.31) 
-0.0197 
 (-3.29) 
My contracted working hours were reduced 0.0167 
 (3.10) 
0.0316 
(3.12) 
0.0185 
(3.13) 
-0.0412 
 (-3.11) 
-0.0256 
 (-3.13) 
Access to paid overtime was restricted   0.0301 
 (12.00) 
0.0571 
(12.44) 
0.0334 
(11.71) 
-0.0744 
 (-12.55) 
-0.0462 
 (-12.02) 
I was required to take unpaid leave -0.0030 
 (-0.37) 
-0.0056 
 (-0.37) 
-0.0033 
 (-0.37) 
0.0073 
 (0.37) 
0.0046 
 (0.37) 
Access to training was restricted 0.0210 
 (7.17) 
0.0398 
(7.21) 
0.0233 
(7.11) 
-0.0519 
 (-7.20) 
-0.0322 
 (-7.25) 
(ii) Index of Recession Effects 0.0179 (21.74) 
0.0336 
(24.40)   
0.0197 
(19.86) 
-0.0438 
(-24.68) 
-0.0274   
(-22.39) 
PANEL B: Dependent variable = Managers here deal with employees honestly (ݐଶ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Effects of Recent Recession: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
My workload increased 0.0197 
(9.74) 
0.0382 
(10.35) 
0.0328 
(10.22) 
-0.0490 
(-10.22) 
-0.0416 
(-10.25) 
My job was re-organised 0.0161 
(7.27) 
0.0313 
(7.30) 
0.0269 
(7.30) 
-0.0403 
(-7.32) 
-0.0341 
(-7.32) 
I was moved to another job 0.0089 
(2.62) 
0.0172 
(2.62) 
0.0148 
(2.61) 
-0.0222 
(-2.62) 
-0.0188 
(-2.61) 
My wages were frozen or cut 0.0115 
(6.42) 
0.0223 
(6.37) 
0.0192 
(6.32) 
-0.0287 
(-6.38) 
-0.0243 
(-6.38) 
My nonwage benefits were reduced 0.0078 
(2.30) 
0.0151 
(2.31) 
0.0130 
(2.30) 
-0.0194 
(-2.31) 
-0.0164 
(-2.30) 
My contracted working hours were reduced 0.0109 
(2.33) 
0.0212 
(2.34) 
0.0182 
(2.34) 
-0.0273 
(-2.33) 
-0.0231 
(-2.34) 
Access to paid overtime was restricted 0.0215 
(9.78) 
0.0417 
(10.15) 
0.0358 
(9.97) 
-0.0536 
(-10.12) 
-0.0454 
(-10.01) 
I was required to take unpaid leave 0.0115 
(6.42) 
0.0223 
(6.37) 
0.0192 
(6.32) 
-0.0287 
(-6.38) 
-0.0243 
(-6.38) 
Access to training was restricted 0.0078 
(2.30) 
0.0151 
(2.31) 
0.0130 
(2.30) 
-0.0194 
(-2.31) 
-0.0164 
(-2.30) 
(ii) Index of Recession Effects 0.0153 (20.64) 
0.0296 
(23.44)  
0.0255 
(22.12) 
-0.0381 
(-23.05) 
-0.0323 
(-23.08) 
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TABLE 3: Employee Trust and the Recent Financial Recession; Ordered Probit Analysis; 
WERS 2011 (Continued) 
PANEL C: Dependent variable = Managers here treat employees fairly (ݐଷ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Effects of Recent Recession: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
My workload increased 0.0248 
(9.66) 
0.0340 
(10.14) 
0.0291 
(10.05) 
-0.0420 
(-9.93) 
-0.0459 
(-10.08) 
My job was re-organised 0.0166 
(5.66) 
0.0228 
(5.70) 
0.0195 
(5.68) 
-0.0281 
(-5.66) 
-0.0307 
(-5.71) 
I was moved to another job 0.0076 
(1.79) 
0.0104 
(1.78) 
0.0090 
(1.78) 
-0.0129 
(-1.79) 
-0.0141 
(-1.78) 
My wages were frozen or cut 0.0158 
(6.94) 
0.0216 
(6.80) 
0.0186 
(6.71) 
-0.0268 
(-6.82) 
-0.0292 
(-6.82) 
My nonwage benefits were reduced 0.0095 
(2.18) 
0.0130 
(2.18) 
0.0111 
(2.18) 
-0.0161 
(-2.18) 
-0.0175 
(-2.18) 
My contracted working hours were reduced 0.0168 
(2.63) 
0.0231 
(2.64) 
0.0198 
(2.66) 
-0.0285 
(-2.63) 
-0.0312 
(-2.65) 
Access to paid overtime was restricted 0.0288 
(10.28) 
0.0394 
(10.44) 
0.0339 
(10.36) 
-0.0488 
(-10.40) 
-0.0533 
(-10.42) 
I was required to take unpaid leave 0.0035 
(0.41) 
0.0048 
(0.41) 
0.0041 
(0.41) 
-0.0059 
(-0.41) 
-0.0064 
(-0.41) 
Access to training was restricted 0.0178 
(5.82) 
0.0244 
(5.81) 
0.0210 
(5.83) 
-0.0302 
(-5.79) 
-0.0330 
(-5.87) 
(ii) Index of Recession Effects 0.0187 (20.96) 
0.0254   
(21.96) 
0.0218 
(21.31) 
-0.0315   
(-21.12) 
-0.0345 
(-22.60)  
PANEL D: Dependent variable = Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views (ݐସ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Effects of Recent Recession: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
My workload increased 0.0013 
(6.00) 
0.0212 
(9.85) 
0.0415  
(10.20) 
0.0279   
(10.03) 
-0.0516   
(-10.22)  
My job was re-organised 0.0009   
(4.54) 
0.0140   
(5.85) 
0.0274   
(5.89) 
0.0185   
(5.88) 
-0.0341 
(-5.89) 
I was moved to another job 0.0005 
     (2.26) 
0.0084  
(2.36) 
0.0165   
(2.36) 
0.0111   
( 2.34) 
-0.0205   
(-2.36) 
My wages were frozen or cut 0.0007   
(4.49) 
0.0111   
(5.81) 
0.0217 
(5.81) 
0.0146 
(5.73) 
-0.0270 
(-5.81) 
My nonwage benefits were reduced 0.0005 
(2.17) 
0.0079 
(2.27) 
0.0153 
(2.28) 
0.0103 
(2.28) 
-0.0191 
( -2.28) 
My contracted working hours were reduced 0.0008 
     (2.33) 
0.0125 
(2.45) 
0.0245 
(2.47) 
0.0165 
(2.48) 
-0.0305 
(-2.46) 
Access to paid overtime was restricted 0.0015 
(5.98) 
0.0249 
(10.72) 
0.0487 
(11.25) 
0.0328 
(10.95) 
-0.0607 
(-11.18) 
I was required to take unpaid leave 0.0002 
    (0.47) 
0.0031   
(0.47) 
0.0062 
(0.47) 
0.0041 
(0.47) 
-0.0076   
(-0.47) 
Access to training was restricted 0.0009 
(4.27) 
0.0140 
(5.30) 
0.0273 
(5.31) 
0.0184 
(5.31) 
-0.0340 
(-5.30) 
(ii) Index of Recession Effects 0.0010   (6.91) 
0.0154   
(19.88) 
0.0299   
(22.42) 
0.0202   
(20.78) 
-0.0373   
(-22.35) 
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TABLE 4:  Employee Trust and Organisational Change; Ordered Probit Analysis; WERS 
2011 
PANEL A: Dependent variable = Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (ݐଵ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0085 
( -1.73) 
0-.0144 
(-1.72) 
-0.0085 
( -1.72) 
0.0186 
(1.72 )  
0.0127 
(1.73) 
Introduction or upgrading of new technology 0.0008 
(0.30) 
0.0015 
(0.30) 
0.0009 
(0.30) 
-0.0019 
( -0.30) 
-0.0013 
( -0.30) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0067 
(2.35) 
0.0114 
(2.35) 
0.0067 
(2.34) 
-0.0147 
(-2.35) 
-0.0100 
(-2.35) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0113 
(3.96)  
0.0192 
(3.95) 
0.0113 
(3.90) 
-0.0248 
(-3.95) 
-0.0170 
( -3.94) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0069 
(2.33) 
0.0117 
(2.33) 
0.0069 
(2.33) 
-0.0151 
( -2.34) 
-0.0103 
( -2.32) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0013 
(0.48) 
0.0023 
(0.48) 
0.0014 
(0.48) 
-0.0029   
( -0.48) 
-0.0020 
( -0.48) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0033 
(1.18) 
0.0056 
(1.18) 
0.0033 
(1.18) 
-0.0073 
(-1.18) 
-0.0050 
( -1.18) 
(ii) Index of organisational change 0.0046 (6.61) 
0.0078 
(6.63) 
0.0046   
(6.48) 
-0.0101   
(-6.62)  
-0.0069   
(-6.62) 
PANEL B: Dependent variable = Managers here deal with employees honestly (ݐଶ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0062 
( -1.44) 
-0.0107 
(-1.44)  
-0.0091 
( -1.44) 
0.0135 
(1.44) 
0.0125 
(1.44)  
Introduction or upgrading of new technology -0.0006 
(-0.23) 
-0.0010 
(-0.23)  
-0.0009 
( -0.23) 
0.0013 
(0.23) 
0.0012 
(0.23) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0054 
(2.13) 
0.0093 
(2.13) 
0.0079 
(2.13) 
-0.0117 
( -2.14)   
-0.0109 
(-2.13) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0113 
(4.47) 
0.0196 
(4.47) 
0.0166 
(4.46 ) 
-0.0246 
( -4.46) 
-0.0228 
( -4.49) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0050 
(1.95) 
0.0087 
(1.95) 
0.0074 
(1.94) 
-0.0110 
(-1.95) 
-0.0102 
(-1.94) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0021 
(0.87) 
0.0037 
(0.87) 
0.0031 
(0.87) 
-0.0046 
( -0.87) 
0-.0043 
( -0.87) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0018 
(0.74)  
0.0032 
(0.73) 
0.0027 
(0.74) 
-0.0040 
( -0.73) 
-0.0037 
( -0.74) 
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0038   (6.17) 
0.0067   
(6.13) 
0.0057   
(6.10) 
-0.0084   
(-6.12)  
-0.0078   
(-6.16) 
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TABLE 4: Employee Trust and Organisational Change; Ordered Probit Analysis; WERS 
2011 (Continued) 
PANEL C: Dependent variable = Managers here treat employees fairly (ݐଷ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0082 
(-1.46) 
-0.0103 
(-1.4) 
-0.0088 
(-1.45)   
0.0124 
(1.45) 
0.0148 
(1.45) 
Introduction or upgrading of new technology 0.0009 
(0.29) 
0.0011 
(0.29) 
0.0010 
(0.29) 
-0.0014 
(-0.29) 
-0.0016 
( -0.29) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0059 
(1.90) 
0.0074 
(1.90) 
0.0063 
(1.90) 
-0.0089 
( -1.90)  
-0.0107 
( -1.90) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0102 
(3.28) 
0.0127 
(3.27) 
0.0108 
(3.27) 
-0.0153 
(-3.28) 
-0.0183 
( -3.27) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0069 
(2.15) 
0.0085 
(2.15) 
0.0073 
(2.13) 
-0.0103 
( -2.15) 
-0.0124 
(-2.14) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0015 
(0.51) 
0.0019 
(0.50) 
0.0016 
(0.51) 
-0.0023 
( -0.50) 
-0.0027 
( -0.51) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0022 
(0.72) 
0.0027 
(0.72) 
0.0023 
(0.72) 
-0.0033 
( -0.72) 
-0.0039 
(-0.72) 
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0042   (5.32)  
0.0052   
(5.30) 
0.0044   
(5.29) 
-0.0063   
(-5.31) 
-0.0075   
(-5.31) 
PANEL D: Dependent variable = Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views (ݐସ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0005 
( -1.49) 
-0.0070 
(-1.52) 
-0.0124 
(-1.52) 
-0.0084 
( -1.51) 
0.0153 
(1.52) 
Introduction or upgrading of new technology 0.0000 
(0.12) 
0.0003 
(0.12) 
0.0006 
(0.12) 
0.0004 
(0.12) 
-0.0007 
( -0.12) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0004 
(2.10) 
0.0055 
(2.15) 
0.0098 
(2.15) 
0.0066 
(2.14) 
-0.0120 
( -2.15) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0006 
(2.87) 
0.0078 
(3.03) 
0.0139 
(3.02) 
0.0093 
(3.01) 
-0.0171 
(-3.03) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0004 
(1.85) 
0.0050 
(1.90) 
0.0088 
(1.90) 
0.0060 
(1.90) 
-0.0109 
( -1.91) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0001 
(0.62) 
0.0016 
(0.62) 
0.0027 
(0.62) 
0.0018 
(0.62) 
-0.0034 
( -0.62) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0002 
(1.08) 
0.0028 
(1.09) 
0.0049 
(1.09) 
0.0033 
(1.09) 
-0.0060 
( -1.09)  
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0003   (4.67) 
0.0034   
(5.43)   
0.0061   
(5.44) 
0.0041   
(5.40) 
-0.0075   
(-5.44)  
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TABLE 5:  Employee Trust and Organisational Change; Ordered Probit Analysis; WERS 
2004 
PANEL A: Dependent variable = Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (ݐଵ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0009  
(-0.21) 
-0.0015   
( -0.21)  
-0.0007   
(-0.21) 
0.0019   
(0.21) 
0.0012   
(0.21) 
Introduction or upgrading of computers -0.0088 
(-2.36) 
-0.0154 
(-2.35) 
-0.0066 
(-2.33) 
0.0191 
(2.35) 
0.0118   
(2.35) 
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0019 
(0.55) 
0.0033   
(0.54) 
0.0014 
(0.55) 
-0.0040   
(-0.55) 
-0.0025   
(-0.55) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0066 
(2.10) 
0.0116 
(2.09) 
0.0050 
(2.06) 
-0.0143  
(-2.09) 
-0.0088  
(-2.08) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0102   
(3.10) 
0.0178 
(3.08) 
0.0076 
(3.05) 
-0.0220 
(-3.07) 
-0.0136   
(-3.10) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0012 
(0.34) 
0.0020 
(0.34) 
0.0009 
(0.34)  
-0.0025 
(-0.34) 
-0.0015 
(-0.34) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees -0.0011 
(-0.27) 
-0.0020 
(-0.27)  
-0.0008 
(-0.27) 
0.0024 
(0.27) 
0.0015 
(0.27) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0090 
(1.89) 
0.0158 
(1.89) 
0.0067 
(1.87) 
-0.0195 
(-1.89) 
-0.0120 
(-1.89) 
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0033   (4.16) 
0.0058   
(4.12) 
0.0025   
(4.02)  
-0.0072   
(-4.13) 
-0.0045   
(-4.11) 
PANEL B: Dependent variable = Managers here deal with employees honestly (ݐଶ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0020 
(-0.53) 
-0.0033 
(-0.53) 
-0.0025 
 (-0.53) 
0.0041 
(0.53) 
0.0036   
(0.53) 
Introduction or upgrading of computers -0.0082 
(-2.42) 
-0.0140 
(-2.42) 
-0.0103 
(-2.42)  
0.0173 
(2.42) 
0.0153   
(2.43) 
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0019 
(0.62)  
0.0032 
(0.62) 
0.0023 
(0.62) 
-0.0040 
(-0.62)   
-0.0035   
(-0.62) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0071 
(2.62) 
0.0121   
(2.61)  
0.0089   
(2.59) 
-0.0149   
(-2.62) 
-0.0131   
(-2.59) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0054 
(1.84) 
0.0093 
(1.84) 
0.0068 
(1.83) 
-.0114 
(-1.84) 
-0.0101   
(-1.84) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0012 
(0.43) 
0.0022 
(0.42) 
0.0016 
(0.43)  
-0.0027 
(-0.43) 
-0.0024 
(-0.43) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0009 
(0.24) 
0.0015 
(0.24) 
0.0011 
(0.24) 
-0.0018 
(-0.24) 
-0.0016 
(-0.24) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0066 
(1.58) 
0.0113 
(1.58) 
0.0083 
(1.57) 
-0.0140   
(-1.58) 
-0.0123 
(-1.58)  
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0026   (3.65) 
0.0044   
(3.61) 
0.0032   
(3.57) 
-0.0054   
(-3.62)  
-0.0048   
(-3.60)  
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TABLE 5: Employee Trust and Organisational Change; Ordered Probit Analysis; WERS 
2004 (Continued) 
PANEL C: Dependent variable = Managers here treat employees fairly (ݐଷ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(i) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0026 
 ( -0.59) 
-0.0033 
(-0.59) 
-0.0026 
(-0.59) 
0.0041 
(0.59)   
0.0043 
(0.59) 
Introduction or upgrading of computers -0.0120 
 (-3.16) 
-0.0153 
(-3.16)  
-0.0121 
(-3.13)   
0.0192 
(3.15) 
0.0203 
(3.16) 
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0013 
(0.37) 
0.0016 
(0.37) 
0.0013 
(0.37) 
-0.0020   
(-0.37) 
-0.0021 
( -0.37) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0089 
(2.72)  
0.0113 
(2.71) 
0.0090 
(2.69) 
-0.0142 
(-2.72) 
-0.0150 
( -2.70) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0047 
(1.38)  
0.0060 
(1.38) 
0.0047 
(1.37) 
-0.0075 
(-1.38) 
-0.0079 
( -1.38) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0003 
(0.08) 
0.0004 
(0.08) 
0.0003 
(0.08) 
-0.0004 
(-0.08) 
-0.0005 
(-0.08) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees -0.0002 
(-0.06) 
-0.0003 
(-0.06) 
-0.0003 
(-0.06) 
0.0004 
(0.06) 
0.0004 
(0.06) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0104 
(2.08) 
0.0133 
(2.08) 
0.0105   
(2.06) 
-0.0166 
( -2.07) 
-0.0175 
(-2.07) 
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0024   
(2.84)  
0.0030   
(2.82)  
0.0024   
(2.82) 
-0.0038   
(-2.82)  
-0.0040   
(-2.83) 
PANEL D: Dependent variable = Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views (ݐସ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
(ii) Organisational Change in Last two years: ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
ME 
(t-stat) 
Introduction of performance related pay -0.0003 
( -0.96) 
-0.0034 
(-0.98) 
-0.0060 
(-0.98) 
-0.0035 
( -0.98) 
0.0076 
(0.98) 
Introduction or upgrading of computers -0.0009 
( -2.67) 
-0.0093 
(-2.76) 
-0.0161 
(-2.75) 
-0.0094 
( -2.75) 
0.0205 
(2.76) 
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0002 
(0.72)  
0.0022 
(0.73) 
0.0038 
(0.73) 
0.0022 
(0.73) 
-0.0049 
( -0.73) 
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0008 
(2.74) 
0.0078 
(2.82) 
0.0135 
(2.81) 
0.0079 
(2.79)   
-0.0173 
(-2.82) 
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0007 
(2.29) 
0.0070 
(2.38) 
0.0121 
(2.36) 
0.0071 
(2.36) 
-0.0154 
( -2.36) 
Changes in work techniques or procedures -0.0001 
(-0.26) 
-0.0008 
(-0.26) 
-0.0014 
( -0.26) 
-0.0008 
( -0.26) 
0.0017 
(0.26) 
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees -0.0001 
(-0.29) 
-0.0011   
(-0.29) 
-0.0019 
(-0.29) 
-0.0011 
( -0.29) 
0.0024 
(0.29) 
Introduction of technologically 
new/significantly improved product 
0.0008 
    (1.85) 
0.0081 
(1.88) 
0.0139 
(1.87) 
0.0082 
(1.87) 
-0.0178 
(-1.87) 
(ii) Index of Organisational Change 0.0002   
(3.15)  
0.0023   
(3.28)  
0.0040   
(3.24) 
0.0024   
(3.22)  
-0.0051   
(-3.26)   
 
 
